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Independence in the Boardroom:
Just How Far Have You Come,
Baby?
Y ears after the Sarbanes-Oxley ("SOX")' corporate
governance reform was supposed to solve the problems
of director dereliction that resulted in the Enron/WorldCom
string of scandals, spectacles of corporate greed continue.
Corporate directors-the supposed guardians of shareholders'
interests-supinely have approved untoward levels of executive2 3 4
pay, sky-high severance payments,3 stock option backdating,
* Professor of Law, Wayne State University Law School. Many thanks go to the
participants at the Law & Society Association and Southeast Association of Law
School Conferences and to Bethany Berger, Derek Bambauer, Steven Davidoff,
and to participants at the Wayne State faculty forum for their comments on earlier
drafts of this Article, as well as to my research assistant, Mila Cobanov.
I Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 11, 15, 28, and 29 U.S.C.) [hereinafter SOX]. For
an overview and analysis of SOX, see generally Lawrence A. Cunningham, The
Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn: Heavy Rhetoric, Light Reform (And It Just Might Work), 35
CONN. L. REV. 915 (2003).
2 See, e.g., In re Viacom Inc. S'holder Derivative Litig., No. 60527/05, 2006 N.Y.
Misc. Lexis 2891, at *24 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 23, 2006) (declining to dismiss
shareholder claims that directors breached their fiduciary duty in approving $160
million in compensation to three executives at a time when the company faced a
$17.5 billion loss).
3 See, e.g., In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 35-36 (Del. 2006)
(exonerating Disney directors from liability despite the directors' approval of a
compensation package for Michael Ovitz that included severance pay of about $130
million although he worked at Disney only fourteen months).
4 See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, SEC Charges Former
Comverse Technology, Inc. CEO, CFO, and General Counsel in Stock Option
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unseemly pension payments to retired executives,5 and bonuses
to retired CEOs 6 and directors, 7 all at shareholder expense.
Although people have been absconding with other people's
money from the dawn of business history, when the best
corporate citizens-large, publicly held corporations that tout
their adoption of corporate best practices-fail amid scandal, it
is bound to create a regulatory ripple. Indeed, the spectacle of
boards of directors asleep at the wheels of governance jarred
Congress into action in the wake of the multibillion-dollar
Enron/WorldCom debacles and the ensuing market downturn."
Congress responded by enacting SOX, setting out a plethora of
new rules that required, among other things, the increased
independence of directors. 9 As a result of the emphasis on
director independence, large public firms in the United States
now have only one or two insiders on their boards.' ° Moreover,
Backdating Scheme (Aug. 9, 2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/
news/press/2006/2006-137.htm (announcing civil charges for backdating stock option
grants against directors and executives at Comverse Technology, Inc.); Press
Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, U.S. Attorney's Office and SEC Separately
Charge Former Brocade CEO and Vice President in Stock Option Backdating
Scheme (July 20, 2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2006/2006-
121.htm (announcing civil and criminal actions against Brocade Communications
Systems for backdating stock option grants and falsifying corporate documents).
5 See generally Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Executive Pensions,
30 J. CORP. L. 823 (2005) (detailing abuses and proposing solutions).
6 See, e.g., Franklin A. Gevurtz, Disney in a Comparative Light, 55 AM. J. COMP.
L. 453,453 (2007) (discussing the bonus payment to outgoing Mannesman CEO).
7 See, e.g., Peter Klinger, Lonmin Gets 'Red Top' Alert over £500,000 Bonus,
TIMES (London), Jan. 22, 2005, at 64 (discretionary payment to a retired director).
8 See JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET 623-24 (3d ed.
2003) (discussing the multibillion-dollar financial scandals in the period, including
not only Enron and WorldCom, but Global Crossing, Tyco, and Adelphia, and
remarking that the number of earnings restatements nearly tripled between 1997
and 2001). These were not merely isolated incidents, but a pattern of events that
deserve analysis. See Cynthia A. Williams, Icarus on Steroids, 94 GEO. L.J. 1197,
1199 n.19 (2006) (book review) (contending that Enron was "part of a pattern of
successful companies that went bankrupt or had major accounting restatements
during 2001-02, and continuing").
9 See Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack
Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521, 1527-28 (2005) (noting that "SOX was
emergency legislation").
10 The results of the 2006 Business Roundtable corporate-governance survey
reported that "85% of . . . company boards are composed of at least 80%
independent directors." Empowering Shareholders on Executive Compensation:
Hearing on H.R. 1257, the Shareholder Vote on Executive Compensation Act Before
the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 110th Cong. 12 (2007) (statement of John J. Castellani,
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the New York Stock Exchange ("NYSE") requires three key
committees-the audit, nominating, and compensation
committees-to have solely independent directors." The
European Union ("EU") also increasingly has focused on
independence in corporate governance.12
Independence as the solution for director dereliction in
corporate governance now appears as a mantra in government
regulation, stock exchange listing requirements, corporate best-
practice standards, and legal commentary.' 3  The premise
underlying this push for independence is that independent
directors are supposed to be better monitors because, in theory
at least, they will be less willing to rubber stamp management
policies and more willing to consider alternative courses of
action. Thus, independent boards are supposed to improve
corporate governance by improving the decisions boards make.
Curiously, however, the independence standards proposed by
regulators, rule makers, and commentators would not have
averted the Enron/WorldCom string of scandals. Enron, for
example, already met corporate best standards for director
independence, and that did not stop the board from falling
asleep at the wheel. 4  Nor have the SOX reforms prevented
subsequent scandals in corporate governance.
President, Business Roundtable). In 2004, only 9% of boards reported three insider
members. Jeffrey N. Gordon, Independent Directors and Stock Market Prices: The
New Corporate Governance Paradigm 14 (Columbia Law & Econ., Working Paper
No. 301, 2006), available at http://papers.ssm.comlsol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=
928100 (noting that "under the influence of Sarbanes-Oxley and the stock exchange
listing rules, the shift [to independent directors] is virtually complete").
11 See NYSE, Inc., Listed Company Manual §§ 303A.03, .05, .06 (2006)
[hereinafter NYSE Manual]. Other exchanges have promulgated equivalent
independence requirements. See, e.g., NASDAQ, Inc., Marketplace Rules
4200(a)(14)-(15), IM-4200, 4350(c)-(d), IM-4350-4 (2006) [hereinafter NASDAQ
Rules].
12 See, e.g., COMM'N OF THE EUROPEAN CMTYS., COMMUNICATION FROM THE
COMMISSION TO THE COUNCIL AND THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT:
MODERNISING COMPANY LAW AND ENHANCING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN
THE EUROPEAN UNION-A PLAN TO MOVE FORWARD 15-16 (2003).
13 See, e.g., SOX, supra note 1, §§ 101-03; NASDAQ Rules, supra note 11,
4350(c); NYSE Manual, supra note 11, §§ 303A.02-.03; PAUL W. MACAVOY & IRA
M. MILLSTEIN, THE RECURRENT CRISIS IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 22-23
(2003) (arguing that case law suggests the role of directors in the corporation should
be to act "independently of management, through a thoughtful and diligent
decision-making process").
14 Although the new standards for director independence offer a stricter and
more comprehensive definition of independence than the prior standards, they still
2007]
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This Article argues that corporate-governance reform, such as
SOX, that focuses on director independence is short sighted.
Independence defined as an absence of conflicting interests does
not go far enough. Because directors function as a small social
network, the dynamics of group decision making mean that
boards need independent thought. Nourishing a culture of
dissent will go farther in promoting the kind of monitoring that
corporate governance is supposed to achieve. Corporate
governance should aim for active, open-minded thinking on the
part of directors faced with important decisions, like hiring and
firing of the chief executive, setting executive pay, granting stock
options, and approving conflict-of-interest transactions.
And this is where diversity comes in. Corporate-governance
reform, with its focus on agency costs, and corporate diversity,
with its emphasis on social equity, would appear to have little
common ground. Both strands of reform, however, share an
important goal: improved functioning of the corporation
through more active decision making by its board. Together,
director independence and diversity can produce more effective
boards, with increased access to, and better analysis of,
information.
Although diversity is becoming an international concern,
ideas about what "diversity" means, and how to achieve it, vary
greatly. On both sides of the Atlantic, diversity is taken to mean
gender and ethnic diversity. This Article argues that, more
broadly, diversity should mean diversity in perspectives, ideas,
and experience. Diversity of thought, this Article contends,
yields what independence rules are designed to achieve: better
monitoring.
Better monitoring does not appear to be the reason that
business leaders at home and abroad tout the benefits of diverse
boards. Some reasons CEOs have given for increasing diversity
are that an increasingly diverse customer base demands a
broader perspective from the firm's board; diverse boards send a
positive message to investors, employees, and the public; and
focus on financial ties and say nothing about the close social ties between directors
and management. See, e.g., Developments in the Law, Corporations and Society,
117 HARV. L. REV. 2169, 2194-2204 (2004) (summarizing the SEC, NYSE, and
NASDAQ rules, and discussing the pros and cons of the new independence
standards promulgated in the wake of the Enron/WorldCom scandals and the
limitations the new standards impose on business and financial ties).
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diversity is good for stock value. 5 Despite touting these ideals,
however, boards of directors in the United States and EU are
not very diverse places. For example, Enron's board had little
diversity: out of fourteen board members, there was only one
woman (who was also Asian) and one African American. 16
This Article argues that diverse boards are more likely to
achieve the kind of active, critical thinking that independence
rules are designed to achieve. To effectuate monitoring and
improve corporate governance, independence must go beyond
the absence of financial conflict to encompass independence of
mind, diversity in viewpoint, and active discussion of alternative
factual inferences and plans of action. These results are more
likely-though by no means guaranteed-if the board is made
up of people from diverse backgrounds and experiences.
Part I of this Article examines the theoretical and empirical
bases for independence as a solution to director dereliction of
monitoring duties. Part II posits that the lack of empirical
support for independence as a solution to director dereliction
may be due to a definitional quandary, and that defining
independence as the mere absence of financial conflicts rather
than as diversity of opinion may be the root of the problem. Part
II turns to cognitive psychology and argues that diverse
perspectives encourage better decision making. While gender
and ethnic diversity are not guarantors of diversity of
perspective, there are good reasons to believe that encouraging
diversity will also encourage a culture of dissent, and thus
improve decision making.
Part III discusses the psychology of small-group dynamics, and
explains the inherent problems of group decision making in
homogeneous groups. Part III suggests ways in which diversity
of opinion mitigates the effects of small-group dynamics. Part
IV examines the dark side of trust fostered by homogeneity, and
suggests ways to overcome resistance to diversity. This Article
concludes that nourishing a culture of dissent is the foundation
for the kind of decision making that leads to effective
15 See Lisa M. Fairfax, The Bottom Line on Board Diversity: A Cost-Benefit
Analysis of the Business Rationales for Diversity on Corporate Boards, 2005 WiS. L.
REV. 795, 810-11, 854 (outlining the principal market-based or economic rationales
for diversity, and concluding that "[d]iversity is an important goal in and of itself,
and it may be costly to hide behind market rhetoric in order to achieve it").
16 Id. at 796 n.3.
2007]
OREGON LAW REVIEW
monitoring, and that while gender and ethnic diversity are not
guarantors of diverse viewpoints, they are a good place to start
in creating the kind of board culture that will take its monitoring
duties seriously.
I
THE INDEPENDENCE SOLUTION TO DIRECTOR DERELICTION
SOX's principal solution regarding corporate governance was
to emphasize the role of independent directors in the firm. 7
SOX accomplished this by more strictly defining independence
as the absence of financial interest, by placing independent
directors on audit committees in charge of the relationship
between firms and their auditors, and by putting the audit
committees in charge of monitoring a system of internal
accounting controls-put in place by the chief executive and
chief financial officers-to ensure that the flow of information
reaches the audit committees.'
8
Because SOX applies to foreign issuers as well as domestic
ones, this regulatory response created a furor abroad, with
accusations of regulatory imperialism.' 9 At first, the EU said
17 See, e.g., Erica Beecher-Monas, Corporate Governance in the Wake of Enron:
An Examination of the Audit Committee Solution to Corporate Fraud, 55 ADMIN. L.
REV. 357, 363 (2003) (discussing Sarbanes-Oxley's emphasis on the role of
independent directors in monitoring the firm).
18 Under SOX, the auditor is to be hired by, and report directly to, the audit
committee, which must be composed of independent directors. SOX §§ 204,
301(2)-(3). At least one of those directors must be a financial expert. Id. § 407.
Section 407 provides that if the audit committee has no financial expert, the firm
must disclose the reasons for the absence. Id. Under section 302(a), the chief
executive officer and chief financial officer must certify that they have set up an
internal controls system designed to ensure that material information reaches
upper-level management. Id. § 302(a). The CEO and CFO also must certify that
they have disclosed any deficiencies, fraud, or significant changes in the internal
controls to the auditors and the audit committee. Id. This places the audit
committee, with its independent directors, at the pinnacle of firm management.
19 See Elizabeth Goldberg, Playing Defense Overseas: American Lawyers
Crisscross the Globe as Foreign Clients Face More Scrutiny from U.S. Regulators
and Law Enforcement, CORP. COUNS., Nov. 2006, at S12. Giving bite to the claims
of regulatory imperialism, the SEC filed civil fraud actions against both Parmalat
and Vivendi (so far resulting in a $50 million settlement from Vivendi). Id. (noting
the Parmalat settlement with the SEC); Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n,
Commission Settles Civil Fraud Action Against Vivendi Universal, S.A., Its Former
CEO, Jean-Marie Messier, and Its Former CFO, Guillaume Hannezo (Dec. 23,
2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2003-184.htm.
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U.S.-type scandals could not happen in Europe. Then along
came scandals involving Vivendi (France), Ahold (Netherlands),
Adecco (Switzerland), Elan (Ireland), and Parmalat (Italy), all
involving financial misrepresentations missed by corporate
boards. The EU Finance Ministers called for action and issued a
report calling for independent directors to control audits,
executive compensation, and selection of directors. Although
the European Commission Action Plan rejected the idea of an
EU corporate-governance code, advocating instead a broad
framework with member flexibility and mutual recognition,1 the
OECD corporate-governance principles similarly stress the
importance of nonexecutive directors.2 The EU now uses a
principles-based approach with companies subscribing to
corporate-governance standards and disclosing areas of
noncompliance.23
Whether in the United States or EU, some features of
corporate governance are relatively uncontroversial. Almost
universally, corporations are supposed to be managed by, or
24under the direction of, the board of directors. A key feature of
the board is that it acts as a group in its decision-making
processes, including its primary function of monitoring firm
management. But while there has been substantial convergence
on the importance of board monitoring, the structure and
membership of boards vary greatly. Germany, the Netherlands,
and Sweden, as well as some other EU countries, employ a two-
20 See HIGH LEVEL GROUP OF CO. LAW EXPERTS, EUROPEAN COMM'N, A
MODERN REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR COMPANY LAW IN EUROPE 59-64
(Nov. 4, 2002), available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal-market/company/docs/
modern/report en.pdf.
21 See Latham & Watkins Corp. Dep't, The European Commission Publishes its
Action Plan on Modernizing European Company Law & Enhancing Corporate
Governance in Response to Enron, Ahold, and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, CLIENT
ALERT (Latham & Watkins LLP, New York, N.Y.), May 28, 2003, at 1, available at
http://www.lw.com/upload/pubContent/-pdf/pub747.pdf.
22 See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., OECD PRINCIPLES OF
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 25 (2004), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/
32/18/31557724.pdf.
23 See generally id.
24 See Franklin A. Gevurtz, The European Origins and the Spread of the
Corporate Board of Directors, 33 STETSON L. REV. 925, 925 (2004) (noting the
convergence among nations on the use of the board of directors as the governing
body for larger business organizations).
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tiered board system. 2 Employee-elected representatives, as well
as shareholder-elected members, sit on the supervisory board.26
The supervisory board monitors, while the management board
manages the firm. 7 At first glance, this is quite a different
system from the unitary board system of the United States and
United Kingdom. However, in the unitary system the functions
of monitoring and managing are separated by the delegation of
certain critical decisions to committees of independent directors,
such as the audit, compensation, and nominating committees. 
28
The requirement of director independence is problematic in
some countries, such as Germany, where the supervisory board
29
must by law include employees. Pre-SOX, audit committees
were unusual in many countries. SOX's requirement that the
audit committee hire, fire, and oversee the auditors is
problematic in countries such as Italy and Japan, where only theS 30
shareholders may retain the auditor. SOX's requirement of
audit committee control became quite controversial, and as a
result of the controversy, the SEC created a few exemptions for
25 See, e.g., Florence Shu-Acquaye, Corporate Goverance Issues: United States
and the European Union, 29 HOUS. J. INT'L L. 583, 617-18 (2007) (discussing the
two-tiered boards in Germany, Netherlands, Sweden, Austria, and Denmark).
26 See, e.g., JONATHAN P. CHARKHAM, KEEPING GOOD COMPANY: A STUDY
OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN FIVE COUNTRIES 17-25 (1994) (discussing the
German two-tiered system).
27 Id. at 17.
28 See Klaus J. Hopt, Corporate Governance in Germany, in CAPITAL MARKETS
AND COMPANY LAW 303-05 (Klaus J. Hopt & Eddy Wymeersch eds., 2003)
(discussing advantages and disadvantages of the one- and two-tiered systems).
29 See Thomas J. Andre, Jr., Some Reflections on German Corporate Governance:
A Glimpse at German Supervisory Boards, 70 TUL. L. REV. 1819, 1826 (1996)
(describing the German two-tiered system). This kind of two-tiered board is
supposed to ensure that employee viewpoints are heard in corporate decision
making. Id. It can be circumvented, however, as illustrated by the EUR 5.8 million
Mannesmann settlement of criminal charges brought against the supervisory board.
Derek Scally, Deutsche Bank Boss to Pay EUR 3.2m, IRISH TIMES, Nov. 25, 2006, at
19. The charges stemmed from the 2000 Vodafone acquisition of Mannesmann,
which included bonus payments of EUR 56 million that had to be approved by the
Mannesmann supervisory board. See Roger Boyes, Mired by Swoop from Seven
Years Ago, TIMES (London), Oct. 26, 2006, at 65. The supervisory board met and
approved the bonuses without the participation of the two labor representatives on
the board. Id. The board only later informed the two labor representatives by
telephone after the board had decided to award the bonus. See id.
30 See, e.g., Brian R. Cheffins & Bernard S. Black, Outside Director Liability
Across Countries, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1385, 1457 & n.453 (2006) (noting that Japan's
shareholders select the auditor, necessitating an exception from Sarbanes-Oxley).
[Vol. 86, 373
Marrying Diversity and Independence in the Boardroom
foreign issuers-primarily to accommodate the structural
problems in Germany, Japan, and Italy-as long as issuers
disclose their reliance on the exemption and assess whether and
how their reliance on the exemption affects their ability to
comply with the other regulations. 3' This is an approach similar
to that of a minority of EU members, which require companies
to disclose and explain any failures to comply with corporate
governance codes.32
Despite the protests, EU member states actually have fallen
into line with SOX requirements. Two of the EU members with
the largest markets, France and Germany, more or less have
transplanted SOX into their own corporate-governance codes.
France, in July 2003, adopted provisions similar to SOX
regarding independent directors, audit committee independence,
and an annual corporate-governance statement specifying how
the board functions and its control procedures.33 Germany too
has adopted a ten-point action plan.34  In response to the
Parmalat scandal, the European Parliament adopted a resolution
on corporate governance, encouraging the presence of
independent directors.3 5 French and UK boards increased their
percentage of independent board members. Moreover, in
31 SOX section 404 will apply to foreign filers issuing public securities in the
United States; however, it is unclear how foreign filers will solve the problems of
section 404 certification requirements if they have audit committees that do not
comply with either voluntary codes or SOX. In the United Kingdom, for example,
the Financial Services Authority adopted a Combined Code in July 2003 as an
appendix to listing rules for traded companies, but no enforcement mechanisms are
provided. See Thomas J. Dougherty, The Political Economy of Corporations:
Varying Approaches to Corporate Governance Around the World, SL085 A.L.I.-
A.B.A. 253, 256 (May 2006). Rather, the expectation is that the market will reflect
the investors' assessments of the departure. Id. This "comply-or-explain" regime,
similar to those of other EU nations, which mainly have voluntary governance
codes, may itself be influenced by the SOX requirements. See id. at 256-58
(discussing varying approaches to corporate governance and the influence SOX
may have on these regimes).
32 See Dougherty, supra note 31, at 257.
33 See Luca Enriques, Bad Apples, Bad Oranges: A Comment from Old Europe
on Post-Enron Corporate Governance Reforms, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 911,
918-20 (2003) (discussing French legislative provisions equivalent to those of SOX).
34 See id. at 918-25.
35 EUROPEAN COMM'N, GENERAL REPORT ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THE
EUROPEAN UNION 2004, at 21 (2005), available at http://europa.eu/generalreport/
en/rg2004.pdf.
36 See Joe Griesedieck & Caroline Nahas, Winning the Race for Independence in
the Boardroom, EXECUTIVE INSIGHT (Korn/Ferry Int'l, L.A., Cal.), 2005, at 2,
2007]
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response to the accounting scandals at Parmalat and Ahold, the
EU's 8th Company Law Directive on statutory audit requires a
listed company to set up an audit committee with independent
members to select and oversee the auditor and auditing
37process.
A. What Is Independence?
Long before the enactment of SOX, U.S. corporations had
38been moving toward independent boards. Corporate best
practices recommended boards with "a majority of directors who
are free of any significant relationship ... with the corporation's
senior executives., 39 The definition of "significant relationship"
included the firm's principal outside law firm, investment bank,
and customer/supplier relationships above $200,000.40 The
NYSE listing rules now require that the independent director
have "no material relationship with the listed company" as a
"partner, shareholder or officer of an organization that has a
relationship with the company" and address the effects of prior
employment, family ties, and consulting and charitable
relationships.41 In the United Kingdom, an independent director
available at http://www.kornferry.com.br/site/pdf/mediaarticles-bl047.pdf (noting
that the Korn/Ferry International 2004 survey reported an average increase of one
independent director on the boards of French and UK companies during 2004).
37 See Press Release, European Comm'n, Charlie McCreevy, Commissioner for
Internal Market and Services, Welcomes the Agreement Reached in Council on the
8th Company Law Directive on Statutory Audit (Oct. 11, 2005),
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/05/1249&format=PDF
&aged=l&language=EN&guiLanguage=en.
38 See generally Bus. Roundtable, The Role and Composition of the Board of
Directors of the Large Publicly Owned Corporation, 33 Bus. LAW. 2083, 2105-09
(1978) (arguing for independent boards).
39 1 AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS
AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 3A.01 (1992) [hereinafter ALl PRINCIPLES]; see also
NAT'L ASS'N OF CORP. DIRS., REPORT OF THE NACD BLUE RIBBON
COMMISSION ON DIRECTOR PROFESSIONALISM 11, 31, 41 (2005).
40 See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 39, § 1.34.
41 NYSE Manual, supra note 11, § 303A.00. NASDAQ has similar rules, again
focused on financial ties and family relationships. See NASDAQ Rules, supra note
11, 4200(a)(15). Independence for directors serving on the audit committee is
regulated by the SEC. See, e.g., SEC Listing Standards Relating to Audit
Committees, 17 CFR § 240.10A-3(b) (2007).
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must have had no business relationship with the firm for at least
42five years.
Although the current standards for director independence
offer a stricter and more comprehensive definition of
independence than the prior standards, they still focus on
financial ties and say nothing about the close social ties between
directors and management.43  CEOs, even where firms have
independent nominating committees, still heavily influence
board selection." New SEC rules attempt to diminish this
influence by requiring disclosure of nominating committee
practices with respect to the committees' search and evaluation45
processes. However, the role of the CEO in recommending
directors to the nominating committee means that many
directors-independent though they may be-will be reluctant
to voice dissent for fear of being asked to resign.46 Moreover,
the social connections between even financially independent
board members and CEOs can undermine active monitoring of
the firm.47
B. What Independence Is Supposed to Achieve
The basic risk created by the separation of ownership and
control is that those in control will line their pockets at the
42 Griesedieck & Nahas, supra note 36, at 4 (citing FIN. REPORTING COUNCIL,
THE COMBINED CODE ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (2003)).
43 See, e.g., Developments in the Law, supra note 14, at 2194-98.
44 See LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE
UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 80-86 (2004) (observing
that the CEO, even if informally, exercises enormous power over the nominees to
the board); JAY W. LORSCH WITH ELIZABETH MACIVER, PAWNS OR
POTENTATES: THE REALITY OF AMERICA'S CORPORATE BOARDS 20-23 (1989).
45 Disclosure Regarding Nominating Committee Functions and Communications
Between Security Holders and Boards of Directors: Republication, Securities Act
Release No. 8340, Exchange Act Release No. 48,825, Investment Company Act
Release No. 26,262, 68 Fed. Reg. 69,204, 69,205 (Dec. 11, 2003); see also NASDAQ
Rules, supra note 11, 3450(c); NYSE Manual, supra note 11, § 303A.02.
46 See Eric M. Fogel et al., Public Company Shareholders Acting as Owners:
Three Reforms-Introducing the "Oversight Shareholder," 29 DEL. J. CORP. L. 517,
518 (2004) (proposing more active shareholder monitoring through securing
shareholder access to observe board meetings).
47 See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 44, at 25-26 (noting the pressures on board
members to please the CEO, who is instrumental in the nomination process); James
D. Westphal & Edward J. Zajac, Who Shall Govern? CEO/Board Power,




investors' expense, diverting funds or shirking in their efforts.48
This classic agency problem can be solved, in theory at least, by
monitoring the firm's managers. Monitoring may be achieved by
shareholders or their representatives. Whoever does it, the
effectiveness of the monitoring has repercussions not only on the
individual firm and its shareholders, but on society as a whole.49
Without trust in the corporate-governance system, the economy
will stagnate. It is a truism that economic growth and financial
development depend on the willingness of investors to trust their
funds to the management of others.5°
However, monitoring is costly. Where there is a controlling
shareholder block, controlling shareholders have incentives to
monitor effectively. 5' The downside of monitoring by
controlling shareholders, however, is their ability to extract rents
beyond the costs of monitoring.52 This feature of rent extraction
makes it more difficult to sell minority shares. Thus, one cost of
a system where large blockholders or controlling shareholders
monitor, such as in the continental EU, is diminished liquidity.
At the opposite pole, widely held shareholder systems, such as
those of the United States and United Kingdom, have increased
liquidity but more monitoring problems. There is little incentive
in such systems for shareholder monitoring. Because of
collective action problems in widely held corporations,
48 See ADOLPH A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN
CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 119-25 (1933) (describing the effects of
separating ownership and control and discussing the ramifications of the ensuing
agency problems).
49 See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson, Controlling Shareholders and Corporate
Governance: Complicating the Comparative Taxonomy, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1641,
1652 (2006) (hypothesizing that the existence of a controlling shareholder serves as
an alternative to independent directors and takeovers, as long as the benefits of
monitoring by the shareholder exceed the extraction of rents by the controlling
shareholder).
50 See Frank B. Cross & Robert A. Prentice, Economies, Capital Markets, and
Securities Law 7 (Univ. Tex. Sch. Law, Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 73, 2006),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=908927 (arguing that controlling investment
risk so that investors will risk their funds has enormous economic benefits and citing
studies in support).
51 See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future as History: The Prospects for Global
Convergence in Corporate Governance and Its Implications, 93 Nw. U. L. REV. 641,
648 (1999) (noting the tradeoff between concentrated ownership, with its superior
monitoring, and dispersed shareholding, with its superior liquidity).
52 See id. at 648 (observing that concentrated ownership depends on hidden
payments).
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shareholders have to delegate monitoring to their
representatives, the board of directors. 3 However, because
directors initially are selected for consideration by the CEO,
obtain their information about the firm from management, and
generally deliberate with the CEO, directors are widely
acknowledged to be co-optable by the management they are
supposed to monitor.
5 4
Independent boards are supposed to improve monitoring
because, in theory at least, they will be less willing to rubber
stamp management policies and more willing to consider
alternative courses of action. Thus, independent boards are
meant to improve corporate governance through more active
board monitoring. Whether this in fact occurs is subject to
considerable debate.
C. Is Independence the Solution to Director Dereliction?
In the United States, a string of corporate disasters in which
management wrongdoing was ignored or abetted by boards
precipitated the congressional action resulting in SOX.5 5 Both
SOX and the new listing rules eventuated by market collapse are
premised on the superiority of independent boards as monitors
of the firm. EU corporate governance codes also stress the
importance of independence of directors to corporate
53 See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Federal Corporate Law: Lessons
from History, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1793, 1804 (2006) (explaining that in large,
publicly held corporations, "shareholders have little incentive to exert effort to
monitor management and actively intervene in corporate decisionmaking").
54 See Cross & Prentice, supra note 50, at 11 (noting that boards of directors
"plainly have failed" at the task of monitoring managers).
55 See, e.g., DENNIS R. BERESFORD ET AL., REPORT OF INVESTIGATION BY THE
SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE COMMITTEE OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF
WORLDCOM, INC. 29-33 (2003), http://fll.findlaw.com/news.findlaw.com/hdocs/
docs/worldcom/bdspcomm60903rpt.pdf (attributing WorldCom's failures to outside
directors who did not understand the firm's finances, failed to notice warning
signals, and were dominated by CEO Bernard "Bernie" Ebbers); WILLIAM C.
POWERS, JR. ET AL., REPORT OF INVESTIGATION BY THE SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE
COMMIT-FEE OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF ENRON CORP. *68-75 (2002), 2002
WL 198018 (detailing the Enron board's failure to monitor its management, notice
warning signals, and elicit important information); Edward S. Adams, Corporate
Governance After Enron and Global Crossing: Comparative Lessons for Cross-
National Improvement, 78 IND. L. J. 723, 777-78 (2003) (arguing that Global
Crossing's board of directors was co-opted by its CEO).
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56governance. But whether independent directors actually
improve monitoring is questionable.57
While in theory one would think that having fewer ties to
management ought to foster the monitoring process, there are
some nagging facts to the contrary. For instance, both Enron
58
and WorldCom had mostly independent boards. Indeed, long
before the advent of SOX and the new listing rules, most large,
publicly held corporations already had independent boards.59
Most also had independent audit committees. 6° Thus, while one
might argue that a strong, independent board will pick audit
committee members willing to take the auditor's side in a
dispute with management, there is little evidence of this
occurring in real life. 6' Notably, SOX, for all its emphasis on
independence and monitoring systems, would not have fixed the
Enron problems; Enron had an internal compliance program,
which the directors ignored, and an audit committee composed
56 See supra notes 33-37 and accompanying text.
57 See, e.g., MARGARET M. BLAIR, OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL: RETHINKING
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 80-83 (1995)
(noting the lack of evidence for independence-based reforms); Stephen M.
Bainbridge, A Critique of the NYSE's Director Independence Listing Standards, 30
SEC. REG. L. J. 370, 393 (2002) (noting that "empirical evidence on the merits of
board independence is mixed").
58 See U.S. PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS OF THE COMM. ON
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, THE ROLE OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS IN
ENRON'S COLLAPSE, S. REP. NO. 107-70, at 15 (2d Sess. 2002) [hereinafter ENRON
REPORT] (describing the Enron Audit Committee Charter); RICHARD C.
BREEDEN, RESTORING TRUST: REPORT TO THE HON. JED S. RAKOFF, THE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK,
ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FOR THE FUTURE OF MCI, INC. 30-31 (2003),
available at http://www.nysd.uscourts.gov/rulings/02cv4963_082603.pdf ("At least
80% of WorldCom's directors during the Ebbers era would probably meet today's
standards for director independence, as well as the standards of the time."); see also
Jeffrey N. Gordon, What Enron Means for the Management and Control of the
Modern Business Corporation. Some Initial Reflections, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1233,
1241 (2002) (noting that the Enron board was "a splendid board on paper, fourteen
members, only two insiders[,] ... the outsiders had relevant business experience,...
the directors owned stock.... [but] was ineffectual in the most fundamental way").
59 See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
60 See Romano, supra note 9, at 1575.
61 See, e.g., Jeffrey Cohen et al., The Corporate Governance Mosaic and Financial
Reporting Quality, 23 J. ACCT. LITERATURE 87, 93 (2004) (asserting that
"independence of audit committees may be affected by the independence of the
board in general" and contending that "there is at least the potential that stronger
boards in general will seek out [audit committee] members who are willing to
confront management to a greater degree than previously.., documented").
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of outside directors (two of whom had financial expertise), and
Enron was repeatedly on Fortune's list of best-managed
companies. 62  Nor would SOX have fixed the problems at
Parmalat: its EUR 1.5 billion in undisclosed debt (funneled into
the CEO's son's soccer team and his daughter's travel business)
were all missed by independent auditors, creditors, and financial
63
analysts .
There is some indication that a higher percentage of outside
directors decreases the occurrence of financial fraud. 64 But this
65
evidence is equivocal at best. Examining the relationship
between corporate-governance measures and financial
misstatements, Professors Anup Agrawal and Sahiba Chadha
found no relation between the probability of financial
restatements and either board independence, audit committee
independence, or auditor conflicts.66 Agrawal and Chadha did
find, however, that the probability of a restatement is
62 See Gordon, supra note 58, at 1241.
63 See Fraud (Parmalat Finanziaria): SEC Accuses Parmalat of $100M Note
Fraud, SEC v. Parmalat Finanziaria, 9 NO. 18 ANDREWS SEC. LITIG. & REG. REP. 8
(West Jan. 14, 2004) (describing basis for SEC enforcement action); David Reilly &
Alessandra Galloni, Top Banks Come Under Scrutiny for Role in Parmalat Scandal,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 28, 2004, at Al.
64 See Mark S. Beasley et al., Fraudulent Financial Reporting: Consideration of
Industry Traits and Corporate Governance Mechanisms, 14 ACCr. HORIZONS 441,
441, 445 (2000) (investigating instances of financial fraud alleged by the SEC in
Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases in three industries over the period
from the late 1980s through the 1990s and concluding that "fraud companies in all
three industries have less independent audit committees and less independent
boards"); Joseph V. Carcello et al., CEO Involvement in Selecting Board Members
and Audit Committee Effectiveness 6 (Soc. Sci. Research Network, Working Paper
Series, Aug. 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=927737 (finding that
independent audit committees are associated with a lower incidence of financial
restatements, but noting the equivocal evidences of other researchers, and
concluding that the negative association of independence and restatements does not
hold when the CEO is involved in the director-selection process).
65 See, e.g., Sondra Marrakchi Chtourou et al., Corporate Governance and
Earnings Management 24-26 (Soc. Sci. Research Network, Working Paper Series,
Apr. 2001), available at http://papers.ssrn.comlsol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=275053
(finding no significant relation between independence and the level of earnings
management).
66 See Anup Agrawal & Sahiba Chadha, Corporate Governance and Accounting
Scandals, 48 J.L. & ECON. 371, 374 (2005) (analyzing 159 U.S. public corporations
that restated their earnings in 2000-2001 and industry-sized matched controls of 159
nonrestating firms to conclude that while independence alone has little effect on the
probability of restatement, having an independent director with financial expertise
does decrease the likelihood of misstatements).
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significantly lower in companies whose boards or audit
committees include an independent director with financial
expertise.67 But mere accounting expertise does not appear to
correlate with willingness to challenge management's position in
a dispute with an auditor, although audit experience apparently
does increase such support.68
There are other troubling aspects of relying on independence
to remedy directors' monitoring failures. A number of recent
studies report a negative correlation between the proportion of
69independent directors and firm performance. When it comes
to setting CEO compensation, independent directors seem to
make little difference; 70 having a high level of independence
appears, counter-intuitively, to correlate with high executive
compensation. 71 In fact, change-in-control severance payments
(known as golden parachutes) actually increase with
independent boards.72 In addition, studies by Professor Mark
67 Id. Under SOX, to qualify as a financial expert "the Commission shall
consider whether a person has, through education and experience as a public
accountant or auditor or a principal financial officer, comptroller, or principal
accounting officer of an issuer," sufficient experience. SOX, supra note 1, § 407(b).
Two of the Enron audit committee's members were financial experts under this
definition. Enron Corp., 2001 Proxy Proposal (Form DEF 14A), at 44-47 (Mar. 27,
2001).
68 F. Todd DeZoort & Steven E. Salterio, The Effects of Corporate Governance
Experience and Financial-Reporting and Audit Knowledge on Audit Committee
Members'Judgments, 20 AUDITING 31, 43 (2001).
69 See, e.g., Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Non-Correlation Between Board
Independence and Long-Term Firm Performance, 27 J. CORP. L. 231, 233 (2002)
(noting that studies contradict conventional wisdom about the relationship between
board composition and firm performance).
70 See Donald C. Langevoort, Resetting the Corporate Thermostat: Lessons from
the Recent Financial Scandals About Self-Deception, Deceiving Others and the
Design of Internal Controls, 93 GEO. L.J. 285, 292-95 (2004) (noting that
management's ability to distort information will not be solved by the presence of
independent directors on the board).
71 See Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Uncertain Relationship Between
Board Compensation and Firm Performance, 54 BUS. LAW. 921, 930-32 (1999)
(noting empirical studies suggesting that high executive remuneration is correlated
with high levels of board independence). At Enron, for example, the remuneration
committee appeared to believe that its function was to pay Enron executives more
than those at competing firms. See ENRON REPORT, supra note 58, at 53-54.
72 See, e.g., Philip L. Cochran et al., The Composition of Boards of Directors and
Incidence of Golden Parachutes, 28 ACAD. MGMT. J. 664, 667-68 (1985); Habir
Singh & Farid Harianto, Management-Board Relationships, Takeover Risk, and the
Adoption of Golden Parachutes, 32 ACAD. MGMT. J. 7, 20 (1989).
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Beasley, 3 among others, found that the presence of an
independent audit committee does not affect the likelihood of
accounting fraud.74  This may be due to the fact that audit
committees typically meet only two or three times a year, and
while the board as a whole typically meets six or seven times a
year, it has other issues besides financial reporting on its
agenda.75 Independent directors spend relatively little time onthei boad •76
their board duties. Moreover, even when the audit committee
is composed solely of independent directors, management
asserts a considerable influence over the quality of the
interactions between the audit committee and the external
auditor.7
As for independence as a cure-all, one recent study finds that
the presence of a chief financial officer ("CFO") on the board
actually decreases the likelihood of financial fraud.7 8  Even
where the majority is composed of outside directors, insiders
remain a strong influence. 79  This is because most of the
73 See, e.g., Mark S. Beasley, An Empirical Analysis of the Relation Between the
Board of Director Composition and Financial Statement Fraud, 71 ACCT. REV. 443,
443 (1996). In a study of the relationship between board composition and the
likelihood of financial statement fraud, using a matched sample of fraudulent and
nonfraudulent firms, Beasley reported that while nonfraudulent firms tend to have
a larger proportion of outside directors than fraudulent firms, "no-fraud firms are
not significantly more likely to have an audit committee, and the interaction of
board composition with audit committee presence does not significantly affect the
likelihood of financial statement fraud." See id. at 445; see also Cohen et al., supra
note 61, at 100 ("Surprisingly, the results [of Beasley's study] indicate that the
presence of an audit committee was not associated with a reduced likelihood of
financial statement fraud.").
74 See Romano, supra note 9, at 1525-33 (noting that Congress ignored evidence
showing that independent directors would not solve the problem of fraudulent
accounting practices).
75 See Agrawal & Chadha, supra note 66, at 375 (explaining Beasley's findings
that the audit committee composition made no difference in the incidence of fraud).
76 See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 44, at 36-37 (citing surveys showing that
independent directors spend an average of 100 hours yearly on directorial duties in
2001).
77 See generally Ganesh Krishnamoorthy et al., Audit Committee Effectiveness
and Financial Reporting Quality: Implications for Auditor Independence, AUSTL.
ACC. REV., Nov. 1, 2002, at *1-12, available at 2002 WLNR 11692403 (survey
study of audit committee effectiveness concluding that audit committees ought to
play a greater role in monitoring).
78 See Bhagat & Black, supra note 71, at 923.
79 See James P. Walsh & James K. Seward, On the Efficiency of Internal and
External Corporate Control Mechanisms, 15 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 421, 434 (1990)
(citing studies showing that "there does not yet seem to be consensus support
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independent directors' information will still come, directly or
indirectly, through the CEO and CFO. 80  Because the
independent board members normally will set the CEO's pay,
the CEO has an incentive to paint a positive picture, favorably
skewing information reaching them.8'
Although audited financial reports ought to provide a check
on management misinformation, auditors also get their
information from management, and risk-management
accounting means that only those items deemed high risk for the
82business are checked regularly outside the firm. Finding
financial fraud is quite difficult, even for seasoned, independent
83auditors. Noting "the inherent limitations of any outside party
to discover the presence of fraud," a report by the six largest
accounting firms urges that periodic forensic accounting be
required rather than simply relying on the quarterly or annual
auditing process.84 Moreover, the willingness of audit committee
(either theoretically or empirically) for the conventional wisdom that either an
increased presence of outsiders on the board of directors or the increased
ownership stakes by any shareholder group (including management) necessarily
improve corporate performance").
80 Hence the protestations of the Enron board members that they knew nothing
about the dire straits of the corporation and that management withheld key
information from them. See POWERS, JR. ET AL., supra note 55, at *6.
81 See Bernard Black, The Core Institutions That Support Strong Securities
Markets, 55 BuS. LAW. 1565, 1567-71 (2000) (noting that insiders will provide
inaccurate information to outside directors in order to manipulate the firm's
valuation).
82 See, e.g., P.W. Wolnizer, Are Audit Committees Red Herrings?, 31 ABACUS 45,
51-53 (1995) (arguing that independent audit committees are unlikely to improve
monitoring and noting that accounting practices permit management a great deal of
discretion in choosing accounting methods and estimates, and that with the
exceptions of cash and inventory, few accounting values are subject to validation
through impartial evidence such as market-based data).
83 See Stefano Grazioli et al., A Cognitive Approach to Fraud Detection 4-8 (Soc.
Sci. Research Network, Working Paper Series, Jan. 3, 2006), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=920222 (noting that because of the low base rate of
financial fraud, a motivated adversary, and intentional strategy, fraud detection is
difficult, and setting out a heuristic to assist in the process).
84 SAMUEL A. DIPIAZZA ET AL., GLOBAL CAPITAL MARKETS AND THE
GLOBAL ECONOMY: A VISION FROM THE CEOs OF THE INTERNATIONAL AUDIT
NETWORKS 12-13 (Nov. 2006), available at http://www.iasb.org/NR/rdonlyres/
727D8COA-0507-41B4-AF3B-F505F78C9B79/0/FINALCEOVision.pdf. This
report was signed by chief executives at BDO International, Deloitte & Touche,
Ernst & Young, Grant Thornton, KPMG, and PricewaterhouseCoopers. The
report proposed periodic forensic auditing; harmonizing the standards of the
International Accounting Standards Board and Financial Accounting Standards
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members to challenge management in disputes with auditors is
questionable.85  The Enron directors had a sophisticated
compliance program, which should have funneled information to
the (mostly independent) directors and the (completely
independent) audit committee; the directors either ignored its




Perhaps the lack of empirical support for the regulatory
emphasis on director independence can be traced to a
definitional quandary. Although the purpose of the
independence requirement is to foster objective monitoring of
the firm, the emphasis has been on director disinterest rather
than on independence of thought. Disinterest has been
interpreted as the absence of financial ties as well as the absence
of conflict between duty and self-interest.87 There is more to
independence than mere financial disinterest, however. The
NYSE listing rules appear to recognize the influence of social
ties and group interactions in the requirement that the
independent board members meet separately to evaluate
management performance and shareholder concerns.88 Separate
meetings do not go far enough, however, because the members
Board based on principles; convergence of national audit standards; and
minimization of national differences in the oversight of auditors and enforcement of
audit standards. See id. at 7-14.
85 See generally DeZoort & Salterio, supra note 68 (explaining that although
audit experience does correlate with a director's willingness to support auditors in
disputes with management, this appears to be unrelated to independence, and is not
observed with other types of financial expertise).
86 See ENRON REPORT, supra note 58, at 14-15 (explaining that "[h]igh risk
accounting practices, extensive undisclosed off-the-books transactions,
inappropriate conflict of interest transactions, and excessive compensation plans
were known to and authorized by the Board").
87 See Katherine M. Brown, Note, New Demands, Better Boards: Rethinking
Director Compensation in an Era of Heightened Corporate Governance, 82 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1102, 1110 (2007) (observing that NASDAQ and the NYSE define
independence as having "no material relationship" with the firm (quoting NYSE
Manual, supra note 11, § 303A.02(a))).
88 See Note, Beyond "Independent" Directors: A Functional Approach to Board
Independence, 119 HARv. L. REV. 1553, 1561-62 (2006) (arguing that objective
monitoring requires more than financial disinterest).
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of relational teams, like boards of directors, develop strong
internal relationships and engage with each other repeatedly.
This is the kind of situation that evolutionary game theory
suggests produces cooperative strategies, which may devolve
into collusion. 89  Even independent directors have repeat
interactions not only with each other, but also with management
and the other directors-a situation ripe for fostering collusion
and subverting control mechanisms.
It is for this reason that the emphasis on independence rather
than diversity of viewpoint is misplaced. Financial independence
alone is not enough for effective monitoring, nor is it enough to
abolish familial ties or those social ties that amount to indirect
financial interest.90 What is needed for an effective board is a
mix of people who can provide access to information, critical
thinking about the information presented, active voicing of
alternative courses of action, and some way of reaching
consensus. That is what I mean by a culture of dissent.
Rather than mere financial disinterest, and separate meetings
for discussions of sensitive issues such as executive compensation
and audits, independence should mean independence of thought,
and a willingness to voice dissent. Independent thinking
prevents errors from being correlated, prevents group
polarization skewing the decision in the same direction, and
increases the likelihood that someone in the group will have new
information. "The smartest groups ... are made up of people
with diverse perspectives who are able to stay independent of
each other."9' That boards of directors not only interact with
each other regularly, but usually come from the same
background, social strata, and educational institutions are critical
reasons to advocate diversity in the boardroom. 92
89 See Erica Beecher-Monas, Enron, Epistemology, and Accountability:
Regulating in a Global Economy, 37 IND. L. REV. 141, 157 (2003) (discussing
implications of game theory for corporate governance); see also Kenneth L.
Bettenhausen, Five Years of Groups Research: What We Have Learned and What
Needs to be Addressed, 17 J. MGMT. 345, 361-64 (1991).
90 See Developments in the Law, supra note 14, at 2198-99 (observing that even
indirect financial ties, like those in the case In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litigation,
can influence monitoring).
91 JAMES SUROWIECKI, THE WISDOM OF CROWDS 41 (2004).
92 See generally Kenneth J. Arrow, Methodological Individualism and Social
Knowledge, 84 AM. ECON. REV. 1 (1994) (discussing the limitations of
methodological individualism).
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Remarkable strides appear to have been made in diversifying
American boardrooms: about 75% of Fortune 1000 companies
have at least one minority board member, and 82% have at least
one woman, compared to 44% and 63%, respectively, a decade
93
ago. But this masks the sad fact that only 11% of corporate• •• 94
directors are women, and only 7% are minorities. In other
words, the few women and minorities on boards take boardposiionsat mltipe • 95
positions at multiple corporations. Putting women and
minorities on multiple boards is problematic in itself, in light of
data suggesting that sitting on more than three boards impedes
96effective board monitoring. Not only are there few women and
minority directors to go around, but these few directors rarely sit
on the powerful audit, nominating, or executive compensation• 97
committees. Nonetheless, surveyed CEOs overwhelmingly say
that they expect those numbers to change as boards become
increasingly diverse in the next ten years.98 And this is true not
only in the United States, but in the EU as well, where women
comprise only 7.3% of the membership of boards of directors. 99
93 See Fairfax, supra note 15, at 800 n.17 (citing KORN/FERRY INT'L, 31ST
ANNUAL BOARD OF DIRECTORS STUDY 11 (2004)). Catalyst reports in its 2005
census that women held 14.7% of all Fortune 500 board seats. Press Release,
Catalyst, 2005 Catalyst Census of Women Board Directors of the Fortune 500
Shows 10-Year Trend of Slow Progress and Persistent Challenges (Mar. 29, 2006),
available at http://www.catalystwomen.org/pressroom/press-releases/32906%20-
%20WBD%20release.pdf (noting that at this rate, "it could take 70 years for
women to reach parity with men on corporate boards"). Women of color hold only
3.4% of all Fortune 500 board seats. Id. And one in nine Fortune 500 boards has no
women at all. Id.
94 Bus. for Soc. Responsibility, Board Diversity, http://www.bsr.org/insight/issue-
brief-details.cfm?DocumentlD=443 (last visited Oct. 25, 2007).
95 See Fairfax, supra note 15, at 802 (noting that while only twenty-seven directors
of Fortune 500 companies sit on five or more boards, seven are African Americans,
and of the five directors who sit on six or more boards, four are African
Americans).
96 See LYNNE L. DALLAS, LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY: A SOCIOECONOMIC
APPROACH 574-78 (2005).
97 Marlene A. O'Connor, Women Executives in Gladiator Corporate Cultures:
The Behavioral Dynamics of Gender, Ego, and Power, 65 MD. L. REV. 465, 470
(2006) (noting that while women are less likely to serve on these powerful
committees, they are more likely to serve on corporate social responsibility
committees).
98 KORN/FERRY INT'L, supra note 93, at 11.
99 HEIDRICK & STRUGGLES INT'L, INC., CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN




Lack of diversity remains a major concern in the EU, where 46%
of European companies have no women on their boards, nor do
31% have foreign directors (foreignness apparently being the
EU proxy for ethnic diversity).'00
That diverse boards make better decisions is not a new
observation,01 but it is an important justification for reform,
since corporations are managed by, or under the direction of,
boards of directors. It seems intuitive that individuals with
diverse perspectives and backgrounds will enlarge the scope of
any discussion, considering alternatives and bringing more
information to the table.' °2 People with different backgrounds
have not only different perspectives, but varied approaches to
assessing information, which should, in theory at least, lead to
better decisions. For example, if the predominantly white-male
CEOs of Fortune 500 companies are right about the differences
in male and female traits10 3 (and putting aside the question of
whether these stereotypes are justified), adding a female
perspective only could help make more balanced decisions.
Diversity of thought is important to the quality of board
discussions, and this diversity of experience means that women
and minorities raise new issues for board consideration based on
their unique experiences. ' °4
-EuropeCorpGovOutlook.pdf (noting that while the statistics show a 22% increase
in the number of women on boards, it is up from the low base of 6% in 2003).
100 Id.
101 See, e.g., Lynne L. Dallas, The New Managerialism and Diversity on Corporate
Boards of Directors, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1363, 1403-05 (2002) (concluding that diverse
boards engage in better decision making); Marleen A. O'Connor, The Enron
Board: The Perils of Groupthink, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 1233, 1306-08 (2003)
(contending that "diversity may enhance board effectiveness"); Steven A. Ramirez,
A Flaw in the Sarbanes-Oxley Reform: Can Diversity in the Boardroom Quell
Corporate Corruption?, 77 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 837, 863 (2003) (contending that the
"failure of the Sarbanes-Oxley reforms to address diversity will ultimately also hurt
the ability of American business to attract capital in international markets").
102 Susan E. Jackson, Consequences of Group Composition for the Interpersonal
Dynamics of Strategic Issue Processing, in 8 ADVANCES IN STRATEGIC
MANAGEMENT 355-59 (Paul Shrivastava et al. eds., 1992).
103 According to these stereotypes, males are risk taking, self-confident,
competitive, decisive, and direct, whereas women are empathetic, supportive,
nurturing, relationship building, and power sharing. See, e.g., KORN/FERRY INT'L,
supra note 93, at 11.
104 See VICKI W. KRAMER ET AL., CRITICAL MASS ON CORPORATE BOARDS:
WHY THREE OR MORE WOMEN ENHANCE GOVERNANCE 8 (Wellesley Ctrs. for
Women, Report No. WCW 11, 2006) (surveying men and women board members
and CEOs, and finding that "[m]any respondents mentioned the importance of
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Indeed, the Canadian experience with diverse boards is
revealing. A study by the Conference Board of Canada found
that 94% of boards with at least three women ensured
compliance with internal conflict-of-interest guidelines, while
only 68% of all-male boards complied.'1 5 Diverse boards also
assumed corporate-governance responsibilities with greater
frequency, which, together with numerous other examples of
how diverse boards functioned, led the Canadian Report to
conclude that diversity "does change the functioning and
deliberative style of the board in clear and consistent ways.
106
A recent study by the Wellesley Centers for Women
concludes that not only do women on the board make a
difference, but the number of women matters.'0 7 When there is
only one woman on a board, her view represents "a woman's
point of view," and may be disregarded by her fellow board
members. 108  But on boards with three or more women, the
female board members are treated as individuals, with divergent
points of view that can have a more substantive effect on board
decision making.1' 9 The Wellesley study found that having a
critical mass of women directors enhances board decision
making by changing board dynamics and raising different issues,
so that difficult issues were less likely to be ignored, and the
content of the discussion was more likely to include perspectives
of multiple stakeholders." °  One CEO identified "more
transparency with diversity... and people express opinions in a
clearer way. '
diversity of thought to the quality of board discussions and linked diversity of
thought to different categories of diversity, including gender, race/ethnicity,
national origin, field of interest, and position").
105 DAVID A.H. BROWN ET AL., WOMEN ON BOARDS: NOT JUST THE RIGHT
THING ... BUT THE "BRIGHT" THING 13 (Conference Bd. of Can., May 2002),
available at http://www.conferenceboard.ca/documents.asp?rnext=374.
106 Id. at ii.
107 See KRAMER ET AL., supra note 104, at iv-v (concluding that "a critical mass
of three or more women can cause a fundamental change in the boardroom and
enhance corporate governance").
108 Id. at 18.
109 See id. at 34.
110 See id. at 9 (finding that a majority of directors and CEOs interviewed






In addition to the empirical studies that cast doubt on
independence as a solution to board dereliction, cognitive
psychology gives some insight into why merely removing conflict
of interest may not solve the problem of director dereliction.
Although market theorists have demonstrated that repeat
players in the markets show what James Surowiecki terms "the
wisdom of crowds,' ' 1 2 not all group decisions are good ones.
Interactive groups are especially subject to polarization effects,
herding, and information cascades. Diversity in the makeup of
the group should ameliorate these problems. The importance of
diversity-in the sense of different life experiences, skills, and
cognitive approaches-is that it adds new perspectives that
would otherwise be absent and mitigates some of the effects of
small-group dynamics.1
13
One anomalous tendency of group decisions is that groups
often polarize; that is, the group will make more extreme
decisions than the initial position of any individual in the group
would have predicted. 14 The result is that group decisions tend
to coalesce around an extreme position rather than around the
middle of the individually held antecedent positions.' 5 This is
more acute when the group is homogeneous, such as within the
upper echelon of corporate management, because if group
members share a particular bias, polarization may magnify its
impact. The tendency of directors to share the same social and
educational backgrounds, ethnicity, and gender makes sharing
112 See SUROWIECKI, supra note 91, at XIV, 29-30 (noting the ease with which "a
few biased individuals ... exert undue influence and skew the group's collective
decision").
113 Id. at 29-30.
114 See, e.g., Daniel J. Isenberg, Group Polarization: A Critical Review and Meta-
Analysis, 50 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1141, 1141 (1986) (noting that
group polarization occurs when "an initial tendency of individual group members
toward a given direction is enhanced following group discussion"). For a discussion
of group polarization in the context of audit committee deliberations, see Beecher-
Monas, supra note 17, at 377-80.
115 See Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go to Extremes, 110
YALE L.J. 71, 85-86 (2000) (observing that "[t]he effect of deliberation is both to
decrease variance among group members, as individual differences diminish, and
also to produce convergence on a relatively more extreme point among
predeliberation judgments").
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particular biases-and therefore polarization-more likely.
Because of the phenomenon of group polarization, both risk
aversion and risk preference may be magnified in group
decisions.' ,6 Thus, while random errors of individuals should be
cancelled out by other random errors in a group process, they
are not if the errors are skewed in the same direction.
Moreover, even a small shift in the heterogeneity of the group
can have a large impact on the group's behavior.
'1 7
Disagreement from even one persistent individual will force the
group to discuss the issue more thoroughly than it otherwise
would. 1 8 But a lone member of a minority demographic group
that historically has held less power or social status is not likely
to express that dissent.1 9  While a second minority group
member may improve this situation somewhat, three members
appear to create a supportive environment that makes a real
difference .2
116 See Paul E. Jones & Peter H.M.P. Roelofsma, The Potential for Social
Contextual and Group Biases in Team Decision-Making: Biases, Conditions and
Psychological Mechanisms, 43 ERGONOMICS 1129, 1144 (2000) (noting that two
special cases of group polarization are "risky shift," when the group becomes more
risk seeking, and "cautious shift," when the group becomes more risk averse than
the average tendencies of the individual members).
117 This phenomenon is often referred to as critical mass theory, originating in
theories of collective behavior. See generally Mark Granovetter, Threshold Models
of Collective Behavior, 83 AM. J. SOC. 1420 (1978) (describing the theory of
discontinuity in social influence of a subgroup before and after a critical mass has
been reached). This theory was popularized in MALCOLM GLADWELL, THE
TIPPING POINT: How LITrLE THINGS CAN MAKE A BIG DIFFERENCE (2000).
118 See Charlan Jeanne Nemeth, Differential Contributions of Majority and
Minority Influence, 93 PSYCHOL. REV. 23, 24-25 (1986) (noting that a persistent
minority view influences the group to examine its views more closely, leading to a
higher-quality decision).
119 See Mischa Thompson & Denise Sekaquaptewa, When Being Different Is
Detrimental: Solo Status and the Performance of Women and Racial Minorities, 2
ANALYSES SOC. ISSUES & PUB. POL'Y 183, 185-89 (2002) (noting token members
of a demographic group are stereotyped and isolated, creating self-doubt and
lowering performance).
120 KRAMER ET AL., supra note 104, at 34-36 (referencing JOHN C. TURNER
WITH MICHAEL A. HOGG ET AL., REDISCOVERING THE SOCIAL GROUP: A SELF-
CATEGORIZATION THEORY (1987), to study the critical mass theory in the context
of women directors). The Wellesley Report noted that on boards with two female
board members, the women are frequently still "categorized, stereotyped, ignored
and excluded," and that while "the presence of two women helps," it is still
"difficult for their voices to be heard." KRAMER ET AL., supra note 104, at 32.
2007]
OREGON LAW REVIEW
Complex decisions, like those made by corporate boards, are
not enhanced by group processes.12  Collective processes
magnify systematic errors. 2 2  While group processes do assist
decision making in tasks that have a clear answer (because
individual errors in assessing information tend to cancel each
other out), if the solution is ambiguous, any shared biases of
group members about whether and how to use information may
skew the decision away from the optimal solution. 23 Such
shared biases are common when the group members have strong
social ties. And while economic ties are prohibited by the rules
on director independence, social ties are pervasive. Moreover,
the effects of polarization are magnified in groups with strong
social ties because such cohesive groups tend to have access to
limited argument pools and suppress dissent.1
4
These systematic errors include phenomena such as the
confirmation bias-a tendency for decision makers to seek
evidence that confirms an initial judgment. 125  Other biases
include the egocentric biases of self-interest126 and cognitive
121 See Daniel Gigone & Reid Hastie, Proper Analysis of the Accuracy of Group
Judgments, 121 PSYCHOL. BULL. 149, 149 (1997) (explaining that group
performance will be at the level of the average members).
122 See Norbert L. Kerr et al., Bias in Judgment: Comparing Individuals and
Groups, 103 PSYCHOL. REV. 687, 713-14 (1996) (noting that although the law of
large numbers suggests that random errors will cancel each other out in collective
decisions, systematic errors will be magnified).
123 See Gigone & Hastie, supra note 121, at 159.
124 See TURNER WITH HOGG ET AL., supra note 120, at 159-62; Dominic Abrams
et al., Knowing What to Think by Knowing Who You Are: Self-Categorization and
the Nature of Norm Formation, Conformity and Group Polarization, 29 BRIT. J.
SOC. PSYCHOL. 97, 116-17 (1990); Russell Spears et al., De-Individuation and
Group Polarization in Computer-Mediated Communication, 29 BRIT. J. SOC.
PSYCHOL. 121,130-32 (1990).
125 David M. Sanbonmatsu et al., Overestimating Causality: Attributional Effects
of Confirmatory Processing, 65 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 892, 897-98
(1993) (describing a tendency for decision makers to seek out information that
confirms their initial hypotheses).
126 The tendency to view information in a manner that will bolster one's own
position has been studied in many contexts. See, e.g., Linda Babcock & George
Lowenstein, Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role of Self-Serving Biases, 11 J.
ECON. PERSPS. 109, 111-13, 116-17 (1997) (noting that mock-settlement
participants tend to view the same materials differently depending on whether they
had been assigned to role of plaintiff or defendant, and this tendency is observable
even where there are real consequences, such as in salary negotiations between
teachers' unions and school boards); Kimberly A. Wade-Barzoni et al., Egocentric
Interpretations of Fairness in Asymmetric, Environmental Social Dilemmas:
Explaining Harvesting Behavior and the Role of Communication, 67
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dissonance, 27 which may also skew group decision making,
particularly if the group is homogeneous. A well-documented
bias of individuals is a tendency to overrate their abilities and
their control over events, at least when the questions are difficult
and the decision makers have no prior experience in making
such decisions.128 Moreover, people tend to believe that their
initial judgment is correct, and to ignore information that might
call it into question.1 29 Cognitive dissonance theory suggests that
people tend to take further actions that justify and reinforce
decisions that they have already made.130 For example, gamblers
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 111, 113 (1996)
(finding evidence of egocentric biases in interpreting fairness in the fishing
industry). For a discussion of information-selection biases in the context of
communications regulation, see generally Derek E. Bambauer, Shopping Badly:
Cognitive Biases, Communications, and the Fallacy of the Marketplace of Ideas, 77
U. COLO. L. REV. 649, 673-96 (2006) (discussing information-distorting biases).
127 See generally LEON FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE
(1957). Festinger's theory provoked a great deal of controversy, but the empirical
basis for it appears to have survived the controversy. See, e.g., Thane S. Pittman,
Motivation, in 1 THE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 557-58, 561 (Daniel T.
Gilbert et al. eds., 4th ed. 1998) (detailing the controversy and concluding that
"cognitive dissonance theory is resilient").
128 See Gerd Gigerenzer, The Bounded Rationality of Probabilistic Mental
Models, in RATIONALITY: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES
284, 297-300 (K.I. Manktelow & D.E. Over eds., 1993) (noting the results of two
decades of research showing that test participants were overconfident when judging
the correctness of their answers to difficult general-knowledge questions, and that
participants' overconfidence disappeared when they were directed to assess their
correctness regarding their prior experience in answering similar general-knowledge
tests). One explanation for overconfidence is that people "confuse easily drawn
inferences for easily remembered facts." Hart Blanton et al., Overconfidence as
Dissonance Reduction, 37 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 373, 374 (2001) (citing
studies). However, we do not know if the kind of question domain makes a
difference, or "whether there are simply some domains in which we tend to
exaggerate the accuracy of our knowledge or judgment (not in others)." Robyn M.
Dawes & Matthew Mulford, The False Consensus Effect and Overconfidence: Flaws
in Judgment or Flaws in How We Study Judgment?, 65 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV.
& HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 201,210 (1996). Nonetheless, despite our ignorance
about whether the results in the general-knowledge questions are equally applicable
to the decisions directors make, if our goal is to optimize decision making, we
should implement ways of minimizing such effects.
129 See Blanton et al., supra note 128, at 373 (2001) (citing studies asking people
to evaluate their ability in solving laboratory problems and showing that "people
think that they can solve problems that they cannot, think that they have made
progress toward correct solutions when they have not, and think that they have
drawn correct conclusions when they have not").
130 See FESTINGER, supra note 127, at 18-24.
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and voters are more confident after they have placed their bets
or votes than they were before.'
3
'
In addition, the social environment of board deliberations
may increase overconfidence, because greater overconfidence
has been demonstrated in people acting within small social
networks. 132 These networks are characterized by having: three
to fifteen members, a characteristic many boards of directors
share; someone in a central, coordinating position, such as the
chair-generally the CEO; and weak contact with outsiders, at
133least during the decision process.
A. How Polarization Affects Homogeneous Groups
Rather than fracturing the group into opposing views,
polarization is a consensual shift further in the direction of the
group's initial tendency.3 For polarization to occur, there must• • 135
be an initial leaning of the group in a particular direction. This
kind of predilection is more common if the group is
homogeneous. For example, when there is an underlying norm
endorsing management positions, individuals attempt to signalS 136
that they share the group attitude. This results in a kind of
competition, but since no one can be sure exactly what the
131 See Blanton et al., supra note 128, at 374 (citing studies and arguing that
"overconfidence reflects the motive to maintain a view of the self as a
knowledgeable perceiver who makes sound judgments").
132 Joshua Klayman et al., Overconfidence: It Depends on How, What, and
Whom You Ask, 79 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES
216, 243 (1999) (finding an overall bias toward overconfidence, particularly in small
social networks).
133 See id.
134 James H. Liu & Bibb Latane, Extremitization of Attitudes: Does Thought- and
Discussion-Induced Polarization Cumulate?, 20 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL.
103, 103 (1998) (noting the difference between popular and social scientists'
conceptions of polarization).
135 See Noah E. Friedkin, Choice Shift and Group Polarization, 64 AM. SOC. REV.
856, 856-58 (1999) (explaining the concept of group polarization in terms of a
choice shift, which occurs "when, after a group's interaction on an issue, the mean
final opinion of group members differs from the members' mean initial opinion...
in the opposite direction of the initial inclination of the group").
136 See ROBERT S. BARON ET AL., GROUP PROCESS, GROUP DECISION, GROUP
ACTION 73-75 (1992) (discussing the process of polarization); Robert Steven Baron
& Gard Roper, Reaffirmation of Social Comparison Views of Choice Shifts:
Averaging and Extremity Effects in an Autokinetic Situation, 33 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 521, 528-30 (1976) (hypothesizing that members strive to show
adherence to group norms).
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average is, the value moves in the direction favored by the group
norm. In studies where a group categorized itself as either risk
taking or cautious, group decisions polarized in the risky
direction by stereotypically risk-seeking groups and in the
cautious direction by self-perceived cautious groups, although
risky and cautious individuals tended to shift away from their
individual predilection. 
137
Apparently, this polarization phenomenon is a function of
group discussion. 138  In interactive groups, rather than
responding to information against their position by modifying
their position or lowering their confidence, group members'
interaction increases individuals' confidence in their decisions in
a way that is not justified by increased accuracy.! Instead,
group members frequently fail to respond to the information
presented. 140 Thus, in a group with a strong predilection toward
a particular result, having some group members who oppose the
central tendency will not prevent polarization, although larger
shifts occur in groups of like-minded people.
One explanation for group polarization is that groups have an
internal culture that prefers some values over others.142 This too
is more likely if the group is homogeneous. During discussion,
137 John C. Turner et al., Referent Informational Influence and Group
Polarization, 28 BRIT. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 135, 143 (1989) (noting that "defining the
shared characteristics of the group in advance will ensure that
arguments/positions/members in line with the stereotype will tend to be perceived
as more representative of the group as a whole and hence more persuasive and
valued").
138 BARON ET AL., supra note 136, at 73 (noting the "process whereby group
discussion tends to intensify group opinion, producing more extreme judgments
among group members than existed before discussion").
139 See Chip Heath & Rich Gonzalez, Interaction with Others Increases Decision
Confidence but Not Decision Quality: Evidence Against Information Collection
Views of Interactive Decision Making, 61 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM.
DECISION PROCESSES 305, 306 (1995) (arguing that interaction does not cause
people to assess the available information differently but merely to develop more
coherent rationales for their choices and beliefs). Heath and Gonzalez studied
interactive decision making-individual decisions made after consultation with the
group-and distinguished it from group decision making on the basis that groups
must reach a consensus and the "aggregation procedure may hide or distort changes
in individual preferences." Id. at 307.
140 See id. at 305.
141 See ROGER BROWN, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 222-26 (1986) (discussing studies
on group polarization).
142 See Baron & Roper, supra note 136, at 528-30.
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group members attempt to signal their adherence to these group
norms, but because they do not know ahead of time the level of
group adherence to the norms, the result is a competition that
shifts the initial preferences to a more extreme level. 143 This
means that, if group members share a particular bias, group
dynamics may intensify its impact.' 44  People wish to be
perceived favorably by the group, so they adjust their expressed
opinion in line with their image of the group position, an image
already polarized because of its prototypical nature.
45
Another explanation for the polarization effect is that the
initial declaration of the individual's position was more
moderate than the position the individual really held.' 46 During
group deliberations, as the individual realizes the group position
is more extreme, the individual is freed to express these more
extreme views. 47 In this explanation, there is not really a shift in
underlying attitudes, but merely an increased willingness to
express previously held views. Both this and the preceding
explanation are social comparison theories, and suggest that
group polarization occurs when high-status members of the
group hold more extreme views than the mean. 48 Thus, if the
CEO has a predilection for a particular view, that may shift the
group decision.
Yet another explanation for group polarization is the
.1 149
persuasive arguments theory. Here, the deciding factors are
the number and persuasiveness of the arguments mustered in
support of a given position. 5 0 This theory also relies on a notion
of underlying group orientation, which is more likely in
143 See Glen S. Sanders & Robert S. Baron, Is Social Comparison Irrelevant for
Producing Choice Shifts?, 13 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 303,311 (1977).
144 Id. at 304.
145 TURNER WITH HOGG ET AL., supra note 120, at 156.
146 See Isenberg, supra note 114, at 1142.
147 See id.
148 See George R. Goethals & Mark P. Zanna, The Role of Social Comparison in
Choice Shifts, 37 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1469,1474-75 (1979).
149 Eugene Burnstein & Amiram Vinokur, What a Person Thinks upon Learning
He Has Chosen Differently from Others: Nice Evidence for the Persuasive-
Arguments Explanation of Choice Shifts, 11 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 412,
414-15 (1975) (noting that "[p]ersuasive-arguments theory . . . asserts that
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homogeneous groups. 5' Under this theory, group polarization
occurs when there is a disproportionately large number of
persuasive arguments in the direction the group is leaning.
152
B. Cohesion and Trust
Group behavior is even more complicated to study than
individual behavior. 53  One problem with group studies
conducted in the laboratory is that such groups typically consist
of strangers who meet in the laboratory, without past or future
relationships, to perform a decision task.154 The studies fail to
capture the complex dynamic interactions of people who interact
as a group over time. 5 5 Indeed, a work group is defined as:
[Miade up of individuals who see themselves and who are seen
by others as a social entity, who are interdependent because of
the tasks they perform as members of a group, who are
embedded in one or more larger social systems (e.g.,
community, organization), and who perform tasks that affect
others (such as customers or coworkers).
156
In the corporate board context, group dynamics include not
only the need to accomplish group projects, such as monitoring
management, but also the satisfaction of members' needs and
the maintenance of the group as an ongoing system.157 Trust is
151 See Eugene Burnstein & Amiram Vinokur, Persuasive Argumentation and
Social Comparison as Determinants of Attitude Polarization, 13 J. EXPERIMENTAL
SOC. PSYCHOL. 315, 316-18 (1977) (describing polarization as a result of
informational influence).
152 Id.
153 See, e.g., David A. Kenny et al., Data Analysis in Social Psychology, in 1 THE
HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 234-37 (Daniel T. Gilbert et al. eds., 4th ed.
1998) (explaining the statistical problems with regard to nesting and multiple
independent variables arising when researchers study small-group behavior and
suggesting solutions).
154 See Richard L. Moreland et al., Back to the Future: Social Psychological
Research on Groups, 30 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 548-49 (1994) (assessing
the state of group research).
155 See Joseph E. McGrath & Linda Argote, Group Processes in Organizational
Contexts, in BLACKWELL HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY: GROUP
PROCESSES 605 (Michael A. Hogg & R. Scott Tindale eds., 2001) (noting the
importance of context in the study of group behavior).
156 Richard A. Guzzo & Marcus W. Dickson, Teams in Organizations: Recent
Research on Performance and Effectiveness, 47 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 307, 308-09
(1996).
157 See McGrath & Argote, supra note 155, at 608-09.
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more easily fostered in homogeneous groups. 158 There is a fear
that increased oversight and dissent will breed distrust between
management and directors, causing management to withhold
information, and making the board less effective in its
monitoring and advising roles.159  Indeed, groups experience
enormous pressure to maintain cohesiveness.16 Group members
form an independent social entity embedded in a larger social
system (e.g., an organization), whose decisions affect people
outside the group, such as the managers they monitor or the
shareholders for whom they are supposed to monitor.16' As a
result of this pressure, even independent boards may fail to
realistically assess alternative courses of action.
162
Rather than making a collective decision resulting from many
independent judgments, people in a small group influence each
other's judgments. This makes decisions of small groups more
volatile and extreme. Consensus becomes more important than
dissent because dissent threatens the group's cohesion. Thus,
the effects of polarization may be even greater for homogeneous
boards that interact over many years.
Moreover, the initial speaker-generally the CEO-frames
the discussion.163 This can be crucial for the decision-making
158 Donald C. Langevoort, Overcoming Resistance to Diversity in the Executive
Suite: Grease, Grit, and the Corporate Promotion Tournament, 61 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 1615, 1623 (2004) (discussing research studies).
159 See Developments in the Law, supra note 14, at 2200 (noting the fear that
distrust will decrease cooperation between management and the board).
160 See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 44, at 32 (noting that boards experience
"a strong emphasis on politeness and courtesy and an avoidance of direct conflict
and confrontation" (quoting RAKESH KHURANA, SEARCHING FOR A CORPORATE
SAVIOR: THE IRRATIONAL QUEST FOR CHARISMATIC CEOs 84 (2002)).
161 See McGrath & Argote, supra note 155, at 607-08.
162 See Samuel N. Fraidin, Duty of Care Jurisprudence: Comparing Judicial
Intuition and Social Psychology Research, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 51-52 (2004)
(observing that although trust and cohesiveness are held in high esteem, dissent is
actually associated with more thorough consideration of evidence, and arguing that
judges should consider evidence of dissent as correlated with careful decision
making in duty of care cases).
163 Framing effects are the tendency of people to process information according
to the way it was presented, rather than on its merits. When the same problem is
expressed in two different ways, the same people often make radically different
choices. For example, both patients and physicians reverse their decisions about
treatment when the same information is presented as survival rates versus mortality
rates. See REID HASTIE & ROBYN M. DAWES, RATIONAL CHOICE IN AN
UNCERTAIN WORLD 302 (2001) (describing a decision test in which people who
were informed about treatment options in terms of mortality or survival rates
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process. A meta-analysis of framing effects found that when a
problem was framed in terms of gains, subjects chose the sure
gain in over 60% of the studies, whereas subjects chose the risky
gain in only 40% of the studies.'64 When the problem was
framed as losses, the results were reversed. 16 Moreover, framing
effects are durable; they persist even after their inconsistencies
are explained to people. 66
However, adding pertinent social context information, that is,
more relevant facts about the decision, can affect the way people
respond to these effects. 67 Thus, adding diverse views that may
make information about social context available for discussion
may improve group decision making.
And this brings us to an important caveat on the role of
diversity on corporate boards: it must be true diversity. Neither
race nor gender are necessarily a proxy for diversity of
viewpoint. Having women and minorities on the board who
mimic white male traits and attitudes will do little to achieve
diversity. But people who replicate the attitudes of existing
reversed their treatment preferences depending on how the options were framed).
For a discussion of the research on framing effects, see ERICA BEECHER-MONAS,
EVALUATING SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 168-202 (2007). Framing effects also occur in
social-dilemma games, such as the prisoner's dilemma, where the players are told at
the outset of the game, either explicitly or implicitly, to cooperate or compete. The
economic payoffs remain the same; nonetheless, players told to cooperate (or who
are told they are playing a "community game") are more likely to cooperate, and
players told that they are competing (or who are told that they are playing a "Wall
Street game") are more likely to defect. See generally David Sally, Conversation
and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas: A Meta-Analysis of Experiments from 1958 to
1992, 7 RATIONALITY & SOC'Y 58 (1995).
164 Anton Kuhberger et al., The Effects of Framing, Reflection, Probability, and
Payoff on Risk Preference in Choice Tasks, 78 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM.
DECISION PROCESSES 204, 219 (1999).
165 Id. There have been a host of empirical studies of prospect theory, both in its
original and in its modified version. See George Wu et al., Decision Under Risk, in
BLACKWELL HANDBOOK OF JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING 412-16 (Derek
J. Koehler & Nigel Harvey eds., 2004) (reviewing the literature and concluding that
"a relatively clear picture of risky decision making and prospect theory has
emerged" and proposing future research in mixed gambles, where there is some
possibility of gain and some possibility of loss, as well as research into the role of
emotion in choice).
166 See HASTIE & DAWES, supra note 163, at 306 (explaining that people stood by
their original, contradictory choice even after the inconsistency was explained to
them).
167 James N. Druckman, Using Credible Advice to Overcome Framing Effects, 17
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 62, 77 (2001) (concluding that the pervasiveness of framing
effects may be overstated).
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board members are the most comfortable choices of the CEOs
and other directors responsible for nominating new directors,
because people tend to choose others who share social and
economic backgrounds and who will fit in with the group.168
Moreover, those chosen must be perceived as able to manage
white males-who still make up the vast majority of upper
management-without making these white males
uncomfortable.169  Trust and cohesiveness are sought-after
qualities in a board.
Further, those diverse people with differing viewpoints who
do manage to slip through the nominating process must be
willing to voice their opinion. Without a critical mass, people
tend to be uncomfortable voicing different points of view, an
insight noted by the Supreme Court in Grutter v. Bollinger,
upholding affirmative action at the University of Michigan Law




168 See Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, The Law and Economics of Critical
Race Theory, 112 YALE L.J. 1757, 1804-06 (2003) (book review) (noting bias in the
way directors are selected).
169 See Langevoort, supra note 158, at 1631 (predicting that "any diversity that is
pursued will be women and minorities who mimic white male traits, including
negative stereotyping of other women and minorities").
170 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330-33, 343 (2003) (endorsing business
rationales for diversity as "real" rather than "theoretical," and noting the
importance of critical mass for the voicing of different opinions).
171 Not all diversity scholars agree that critical mass is what we should be aiming
for. For example, Professor Gerken argues for a system that she calls "second
order" diversity, in which diversity among institutional bodies is encouraged rather
than diversity within each body. See Heather K. Gerken, Second-Order Diversity,
118 HARV. L. REV. 1099, 1108 (2005) (discussing tradeoffs in defining diversity as
statistically mirroring the population and in defining diversity as variation among
decision-making bodies rather than within them). Whatever the benefits (and
costs) to democracy of applying this concept to juries and electoral districts,
Professor Gerken recognizes the importance of group dynamics and the key role
that vocal dissent plays in ameliorating polarization, social cascades, and
conformity. Id. at 1191-92. She argues that while ensuring the presence of
dissenters in each decision-making body may improve each body's decision making,
it may result in less dissent in the aggregate. Id. at 1192. Perhaps, but since we are
a long way from having minorities on many boards, never mind having boards
composed entirely of minorities at the helms of Fortune 500 companies, this is
largely an academic debate.
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C. The Role of Disagreement
Two things appear to improve the performance of small
groups: the active discussion of dissenting opinions, and
aggregating the final decision (as in a blind vote). 72  The
importance of diversity-in the sense of different life
experiences, skills, and cognitive approaches-is that it adds new
perspectives that otherwise would be absent and that it mitigates
some of the effects of small-group dynamics. 173 Groups that are
too much alike stagnate because they become increasingly less
174
able to investigate alternative solutions.
Although a group of diverse dummies cannot be expected to
reach better collective decisions than a single smart expert, a
group whose members possess a variety of skills, knowledge, and
aptitude will outperform a small group of experts. Collective
decisions that are achieved through disagreement and contest
are superior to those achieved through consensus or
compromise.176  Expressing dissent can improve the group's
innovation. Creativity is also fostered in groups with active
dissenters. 17  And consideration of alternative solutions to a
172 See SUROWIECKI, supra note 91, at 189-90 (citing study by Alan S. Blinder &
John Morgan, Are Two Heads Better than One? An Experimental Analysis of
Group vs. Individual Decision Making (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 7909, 2000).
173 See id. at 29-30 (noting the ease with which "a few biased individuals [can]
exert undue influence and skew the group's collective decision").
174 See James G. March, Exploration and Exploitation in Organizational
Learning, 2 ORG. SCI. 71, 83-85 (1991) (discussing the potential gains from diversity
in organizations).
175 See SUROWIECKI, supra note 91, at 30.
176 See id. at xix (noting the importance of diversity and independence in
collective decision making).
177 See Carsten K.W. De Dreu & Michael A. West, Minority Dissent and Team
Innovation: The Importance of Participation in Decision Making, 86 J. APPLIED
PSYCHOL. 1191, 1198 (2001) (surveying twenty-eight teams and finding that
expressing dissent was associated with the frequency of improved approaches to
work); Daniel P. Forbes & Frances J. Milliken, Cognition and Corporate
Governance: Understanding Boards of Directors as Strategic Decision-Making
Groups, 24 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 489, 496-97 (1999) (noting that too much cohesion
produces poor decisions).
178 See ANTHONY PATRICK CARNEVALE & SUSAN CAROL STONE, THE
AMERICAN MOSAIC 60-61 (1995) (reviewing studies regarding the benefits of
diversity to creative decision making); Lynn Van Dyne & Richard Saavedra, A
Naturalistic Minority Influence Experiment: Effects on Divergent Thinking, Conflict
and Originality in Work-Groups, 35 BRIT. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 151, 156-63 (1996)
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problem is more likely in a group where there is active dissent.179
Moreover, where there is active disagreement among the group
members before a decision is reached, more information is
discussed during the decision-making process.180
Diversity is important because it prevents errors from being
correlated and skewing the decision in the same direction, and
because it increases the likelihood that someone in the group• e • 181
will have new information. This is a particular problem for
boards of directors, who not only interact with each other
regularly, but usually come from the same background, social
strata, and educational institutions. 182 In an information cascade,
decisions are made by people following the decisions of those
around them rather than relying on their own private
information. Although it is normal and frequently beneficial to
imitate the actions of others, and perhaps we are even
genetically predisposed toward imitation, imitation can be
disastrous, as evident from market bubbles. 83 According to the
financial commentator James Surowiecki, the problem arises
from sequential decision making, and can be mitigated by
simultaneous decision making. 184 Procedures for "secret ballots"
in director voting might increase the influence of diverse
perspectives and help board members stay independent of each
other (and the CEO), thus improving the quality of board
decisions.
(observing that groups of students working together for ten weeks produced more
creative work when the group contained dissenters).
179 See Forbes & Milliken, supra note 177, at 494 (observing that the presence of
dissenting members in the group results in the consideration of more alternatives).
180 See Felix C. Brodbeck et al., The Dissemination of Critical, Unshared
Information in Decision-Making Groups: The Effects of Pre-Discussion Dissent, 32
EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 35, 51 (2002) (observing that dissenting group members are
more likely to bring in new information and propose alternative solutions).
181 See SUROWIECKI, supra note 91, at 41 (noting that "the smartest groups ...
are made up of people with diverse perspectives who are able to stay independent
of each other").
182 See supra text accompanying note 92.
183 See, e.g., Herbert A. Simon, A Mechanism for Social Selection and Successful
Altruism, 250 Sci. 1665-68 (1990) (arguing that most people do not distinguish
between sensible and nonsensical imitation).
184 See SUROWIECKI, supra note 91, at 64-65 (suggesting that organizations
"should have people offer their judgments simultaneously, rather than one after the
other").
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IV
THE DARK SIDE OF TRUST
Trust increases cohesiveness, making group deliberations
quicker and more harmonious. But it has a dark side. Decisions
become less careful, more overconfident, and more extreme.
That dark side manifests itself in the tendency of groups to
reproduce themselves, hiring replicants of the members. Real
diversity enhances decision making, but real diversity is still a
long way off in corporate America, as well as in the EU. Despite
the optimistic predictions of the increased productivity and
profitability that would follow the elimination of discrimination,
discrimination has not yet withered away. 18 5  Why not? It
appears that there is tension between the efficiencies of
improved decision making and the productivity of a group that
shares common traits and backgrounds.
Diversity threatens cohesion. This problem creates resistance
to diversity. Cohesion may make work more productive, or at
least faster, but it threatens good decision making. Empirical
data suggest that the best performing firms are those with a
culture of dissent.186 So even with diverse boards in place-still
largely a pipe dream-a culture of dissent must be nourished for
diversity to have an effect.
Given people's aversion to forces that destroy cohesiveness
and trust, what can be done to achieve this culture of dissent?
Some governments mandate diversity: Norway requires that
40% of board positions go to women.1s7  While such a
requirement probably is not politically feasible in the United
States, Professor Susan Sturm suggests that real diversity is
achievable in the boardroom, as well as the workplace, by
185 See, e.g., Langevoort, supra note 158, at 1622-23 (observing that if
discrimination is inefficient, "patterns of discrimination should wither away as
competition forces its elimination" unless there is insufficient competition or there
are "positive efficiencies to discrimination").
186 Jeffrey A. Sonnenfeld, What Makes Great Boards Great, HARv. Bus. REV.,
Sept. 2002, at 106, 111.
187 Charles Goldsmith, Norway Plans to Require Greater Gender Equality in
Boardrooms, WALL ST. J., July 19, 2002, at A9 (plans to be implemented by 2005);
Norway Enforces Gender Equality, INDEP. (London), Dec. 9, 2005, at 29 (noting




implementing systems designed to overcome the harmful effects
of the tournament structure of promotin.88
For example, at Deloitte & Touche, a major accounting and
investment banking firm, concern from the CEO about the
firm's inability to keep women at higher levels despite
equivalent hiring levels led to institutionalizing a process of data
collection and problem solving. 189  Ultimately, this process
enabled Deloitte to counter what it had identified as the three
major obstacles to women's retention and promotion: a male-
dominated culture that perpetuated stereotypes and assumptions
about women; systems for advancement that worked for men but
not women; and the need for a more balanced work-life
approach. 190 After instituting the process, the percentage of
women admitted to partnership rose and the turnover rate for
female senior managers fell.91
Similarly, the successes of internal programs at Intel and
Home Depot emphasized data collection, objective benchmarks
for promotion, and support from the highest levels in the firm.
This kind of initiative is important, not only for the workplace,
but in achieving a diverse boardroom. Board members are
frequently the CEOs of other firms.
One way to change board culture is to make sure firms are
implementing systems that promote diversity rather than
systems that obscure discrimination. Developing metrics and
requiring disclosure of progress in diversity are first steps.
Currently, firms must disclose, among other things, whether they
188 Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural
Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458, 459-62 (2001). The tournament structure of
promotion was a concept illuminated by Professor Langevoort, who argued that
there is an iterated corporate tournament for positions at the top of the corporate
hierarchy, and that the tournament is won by self-confident, aggressive risk-takers,
who are both loyal and opportunistic, and disinclined to "worry about relationships,
commitments, or ethical distractions when there is a good reason to move on."
Langevoort, supra note 158, at 1627-30. Anyone with a different point of view will
slow things down, and impede the formation of trust. See id. at 1630. This is not, as
Langevoort acknowledges, to suggest any inevitability in the tournament; it is
obviously a social construct. Id. at 1631. But the tournament provides the system
with an automatic tilt that is gender biased, and may be extremely resistant to
change. Id.
189 Sturm, supra note 188, at 492-93 (2001).
190 Id. at 494.
191 Id. at 498.
192 See id. at 519-20.
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have a nominating committee, what its charter is (if any),
whether the members are independent, whether the committee
has any policy with respect to consideration of candidates, and
whether shareholder recommendations will be considered.
Although board membership is disclosed (which generally serves
to inform investors of the gender diversity, if not the racial
diversity, of the board), there is no requirement to disclose
efforts to achieve diversity.
Since, as the truism of managerial courses would have it, you
manage what you measure, quantifying efforts toward diversity
should improve accountability. More qualified women and
minorities at the top of the corporate ladder should ultimately
yield more diverse boards. But this may take time, and what are
we to do in the meantime?
One possibility is to ensure that nominating committees
engage in a process similar to the one developed by Deloitte, in
which outside and inside advisors engage in an interactive
system of collecting data about barriers to entry and addressing
those barriers. Deloitte, for example, worked with two outside
nonprofit research centers, Catalyst and the Center for Gender
in Organizations, to help it analyze both gender problems in the
workforce and gender problems' connection to strategic
objectives and organizational performance. 93 Together, the
three organizations then worked interactively with management
to institute systems to collect data, pool information, develop
and evaluate standards, and improve accountability. 94
Nominating committees charged with disclosure and data
collection may also be able to increase diversity on corporate
boards. As the Wellesley and Canadian studies suggest,
increasing board diversity significantly to achieve a critical mass
of diverse board members should bring new views and
perspectives to the board, along with improved communication
and better decision making.
1 95
CONCLUSION
Apparently unrelated, the international efforts toward
independence and diversity on corporate boards both
193 See id. at 526.
194 Id.
195 See supra notes 105-11 and accompanying text.
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acknowledge that only active, open-minded thinking about the
problems of the firm will improve monitoring. While absence of
financial conflicts may be an obvious first step in improving
board decision making, the empirical data show that
independence is far from the last word in improving governance.
As long as directors come from the same narrow pool of socially
tied and ethnographically indistinguishable people, it will be
difficult to achieve the range of experience and perception that
goes into active, open-minded thinking. Nourishing a culture of
dissent requires respect for differences.
In sum, the reason to nourish diversity is to achieve the better
boards that independence of thought should foster. On grounds
such as better decision making, increased profitability, increased
creativity, and better morale, corporations around the world
have articulated the need for diversity. Putting these words into
practice, however, is proceeding at a glacial pace. One of the
impediments to achieving diverse boards is the difficulty of
resolving the tension between cohesiveness and the intellectual
promise of diversity and dissent. To resolve this tension will
require more than rhetoric. The business community has
embraced the idea-if not yet the reality-of diversity.
Understanding the importance of these goals should help
corporations put into action systems that will enable boards to
achieve the diversity and independence they espouse.
Disclosure of steps taken toward this goal would be a valuable
first step.
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